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I.

Introduction
It is the objective of this study to integrate research in the areas of

industrial organization and international trade theory in order to examine the
way industrial market power influences the export .and import competing perfor.

.

.

.

'

mance of industries and to provide an•'empirical test of its importance in
affecting the international trade perfonnance of U. S. manufacturing indus-·
tries. 1 The existing theory of international trade has been.developed under
the simplifying assumption of perfect competition and, as such, has ignored
0

much of.the progress made in the applied field of industrial organization.
In contrast, the study of industrial organization has emphasized the importance of market power in affecting the decisions, behavior and perfonnance of
finns in.real world industrial markets, but has concerned itself primarily
· with applications to domestic markets.

The reasons for this apparent lack

of integration of alterpative market structures and international trade
theory, as H. G. Johnson [13] has pointed out, include first, the difficulty
of reconciling the essentially general equilibrium nature .of international
trade theory with the partial equilibrium approach of. industrial organization
· and second, the fascination with formal theoretical problems (like th.e
existence, uniqueness and stability of equi 1ibri um solutions) in the pure theory
of trade to the exclusion of empirically relevant proolems.
Recently, however, an interest has arisen concerning the relationship
\
between domestic industry market structure and international trade activity.
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For example,_ Lawrence J. White [26J has presented a theoretical analysis

comparing the international trade performance of competitive vs. monopoly

';;,

· industries.

Moreover, some policymakers in the U.S. have suggested a relaxa-

tion in anti-trust enforcement, par:_ti cul arly with regard to merger activity,
with. the expectation of not only improving the performance of U.S. firms in
export markets, but also increasing their-ability to confront import-competition from abroad. 2 · Unfortunately, with the exception of Whit~ 1 s theoretical
analy$is, the evidence in the,literature especially of an empirical nature,
offers little help in detennining the efficacy of such policies.
The rest of this paper.is concernedwith analyzing th·e affects of market
power on industry exports and imports and provi dfog empirical evidence on the
magnitude of the re!ationship involved.
framework.

Section II presents the ;analytical

_Section III describes the statistical model and variables.

Section

IV presents the empirical results and, finally, Section V discusses our conclusions.

II.

The Role of Market Power in International Trade .
,

,

White's theoretical analysis provides a _useful starting point for
analyzing the impact of-market power on international trade.

One conclusion

emerging from White's paper, is that domestic industry.market structure affects
an industry I s i nternaUona 1 trade perfonnance only when barriers to trade
exi'st.

If the worqd economy is frictionless; i.e. no tariffs, transportation

cos ts or other trade barriers, a domestic monopolist, in effect, becomes a
world competitor constrained by the. world price and his export or import perfonnance is identical to wh.at would have been obtained. if the industry were·
,

.

competitive.· However, wh·en impediments to trade do exist, the world. price
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need not prevail in the domestic market and th~ perfonnance of monopoly and
-~ i.

competitive industries is likely to Mffer substantially,'

In import-competing

situations, White concludes that a monopolized industry is likely to allow
greater levels of imports than would a competitive industry.
situations, however, the results ·ar.e uncertain.

In exporting

A monopolist capable of

international price discrimination (dumping) may export more than a competi-tive industry.3 But, if dumping is impos•sible, the monopolis't may set high
enough prices in the domestic market to return economic profits and, as a
result, export less than a competitive industry.
Interesting as White's analysis is, it only involves the polar cases of
monopoly .and perfect competition.

While real world industries certainly do

exist.inwhichfinnspossess market power, these industries are more likely to
be characterized by oligopoly.

Furthennore, the existence of market _power

alters the constra_ints and opportunities of firms in ways wbich could not be
·incorporated in the geometri c-mathemati cal ,approc1ch _of White, but nonethe 1ess
may be important
in affecting the international trade
performance
of real
- '
.
world industries.

Whether or not the conclusions of the White study are

applicable to the more general cases fbuncl in actual world markets is a
·question which uHimately must. be resolved with empirical evidence.

In what

follows, howev~r, we first examine. some of th~s e additional constraints and
opportunities faci rig fi nns with market power and analyze how_ they might affect ·
export or import-competing_performance.
Let us look first at the iss4e of dumping.

It is well known 1.that this

is a profit maximizing strategy·as long as the fore,ign .elasticity of demand
is greater::· than the home elasticity.

While the traditional _models of dumping,

such as White's, have been applied only to pure monopoly markets, Caves and
Jones [5] have recently argued that dumping ·may be a more common prasti ce in
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the context of oligop·oly.

••'

Their reasoning fa that domestic olfgopolists are .

more likeli to recognize their mutual interdependence in the home market, th~n
.

.

in world markets and, thus, a reduction in price at home is perceived more
.

.

likely to be matched by rivals than a reduction in price abroad.· This implies
that the foreign demand would be viewed as more eiasti c than the home demand
and the conditions necessary for dumping arise.

While legal restrictions do

· exist against.dumping, there is evidence [3,· 7, 17] that indicates this is a
common practice in international transactions.
Moreover, the securing of foreign sales involves difficulties not present
in the case of domestic sales.

Fluctuations in foreign demand and exchange
'

.

'

rates as well as the possibility of political developments affecting the
existence of export markets, make these operations risky, particularly in situations where new capacity might be needed to serve foreign demand.

In addition,

the cost associated w;th entering foreign markets can be substantial,_ especially
.if lar·ge scale marketing operations are necessary to effectively compete witt,
established foreign producers.

Firms possessing market power in their domestic

market are the ones most likely to have the secure source_ of profits and access·
to credit needed to overcome these di ffi cul ti es.- . Thus, market power may afford
firms the ability to be more aggressive in pursuing exporting opportunities.
In addition, the achieving of foreign sales often d_epends upon many nonprice factors.· Kravis and Lipsey

[lr, p. 59] for example, report that among the

most important of these in manufacturing industries are the ability of firms
to supply credit to foreign buyers and the speed and certainty of delivery; and
that often these factors take precedence over price in determining sales.

But., ,

it is precisely these kinds of factors which determine the _distribution of orders
for domestic. sales in oligopolistic industries in which price competition has
been eschewed.

Indeed, one explanation for ·the tendency toward excess capacity
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in these industries has been.that .firms desire to maintain reserve capacity to
enable them to serve customers during peak demand periods in order to retain
buyer loyalty [20]-.

Given that firms in these•industries are more experienced

and familiar with competing on dimensidns oth~r than pfice and may possess_
reserve capacity which allows them faster and more certain delivery schepules,
-

.

'

they accrue advantages in exporting situations over more. competitive firms.
Finally, consideratio~ must be given to the goal_s ~nd motivations of the
Irideed, in recent years it has been suggested [1, 18] that the motivation

firm.

'of firms with market control (especially those management controlled) is maxi.:.
mization of sales or growth rather than profits.

The sales maximizing firm,

however, is constrained in the domestic market by the conditions and growth of
demand, unless it is willing to incur the risk associated with price competition
for rivals' market shares.

Foreign markets can provide a further source of

sales which avoids_ this prqblem and, thus, _export markets may be more vigorously
pursued to achieve these goals.
The preceding analysis indicates that firms in real world industries, in
which soine form of protection from imports results in domestic market control,
may be more successful than. competitive firms in exporting situations not only
because, as White suggests, they can engage in dumping, but also because control over the domestic market may afford them greater' opportunities in competing
i nterna ti ona lly ;:n terms of non-price factors, in overcoming the inherent ·
difficulties of exporting operations and ,in pursuing sales maximization objectives.
Considering now the import side, a number ~f cases arise.

First, if the

price of imports, inclusive of tariffs, is abov~ the dom~stic monopoly price
then ,regard_less of domestic market structure no imports will enter.

If, on the

-6-

other hand, the price of imports is below the domestic competitive price then
'

'

..

· the same level of imports will enter regardless of domesti.c market organization.
Domestic market structure will affect the level of importi only in the c~se
_ where. the price of
imports falls between_ the competitive and monopoly price.
..
'

'

In this instance, a non-c;ompetitive market structure .is likely to allow higher.
import levels than would a perfectly competitive industry because, to the extent
that firms collude (tacitly or overtly) and obtain higher prices than would have
prevailed unde.r competitive conditions, a greater incentive arises for imports _
to enter the market.

Even if domestic firms were to believe that profits could

be maximized by some form of import-forestaning limit pricing, determining the
true limit price would be exceedingly difficult.

Domestic producers are not

likely to have accurate information concerning either the cost factors o.,..
motivatio.ns of foreign producers.

In addition, ·uncertainties exist with respect

to exchange rates, transportation cost, etc.

The results of this strategy,_

therefore, may be an incorrect esti~ation of the li~it price and consequently
a failure to discourage imports.
Moreover, it has been suggested [4] that in face of import competition
oligopolistic industries may simply yield up a share of the domestic market rather
than cut prices to forestall foreign entry.

The reason for this phenomenon.is

that firms, at least in the short run, would rather sacrifice some portion of
the domestic market to foreign competitors than engage in price cutting, which,
if misinterpreted by rivals, could destroy their ag_reed upon price structure.
Evidence reported by Krause [16] for example, suggests that this was typical
of U.S. steel manufactures in the l950's as producers were willing to give up
a share of the domestic market to foreign producers .rather than risk deterioration of complex tacit understandfngs.

-7-

Finally, collusion among firms may result in domestic prices high enough
to make profitable the introduction of imperfect substitutes into the market.
Established producers may ,not introduce the substitute for fear of spoiling
the· market for thei_r original product.

Ba'rriers to entry may_ block potential

domestic .entrants from introducing the substitute.

Foreign producers with no

·fear of spoiling the market for the superior product and in many cases facing
fewer barriers to entry, may find it profitable to introduce the substitute. 4
As White [26] has pointed out, t~is appears to have been the case in the

u~s.

automobile industry in the late 1950 1 s and again in the late 1960 1 s regarding
the.i 1big 11 vs.

III.

11

small 11 car production strategy.

The Statistical Model and Variables
ln this section the empirical content of the market power-international

trade relationship is evaluated by employing multi-variate regression analysis
· on data for United States manufacturi~g industri~s.

Manufacturing industries

were utilized in order to eliminate from consideration raw agricultural commodities and resource intensive items such as petroleum, etc •. The sarriple consists of 88 Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) three-digit
industry groups.

The basis.for selection of these industries was simple.

If

it were possible to locate comparable figures in the U.S. Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) system to those in the SITC system, the industry was
included in the sample. In this regard, a co·n·cordance between the two systems
developed by Hufbauer [12] was _most helpful. 5 ·Multiple regression equatio~s
are estimated for all 88 industries and for two separate sub-samples, consisting of 50 exporting industries and 38 import-competing industries. 6

.-8-

The estimated equations include combinations of 'seven independent variables .
• i

These consist of variables representing domestic market power.and additional
'

industry characteristics, such as economies of scale, product differentiation, research an~ development effort and the geo~raphic extent of the market.

In

what follows the theoretical rationale and a brief explanation of the construction and data source of each variable is provided.
Foreign Trade
Two dependent variables were utilized to represent exporting and importing
activitles in each in"dustry. · These included total U.S. exports (to the rest of·
the world) as a percentage of domestic value of shipments_ (X/VS-) and total U.S.
_imports as a percentage of domestic value of shipments {M/VS) for 1965.

Exports

: and imports were deflated by domest,ic shipments in each of the industries in
-

.

.

.

.

.

'

order to eliminate possible scale effects and. to render them comparable from
one industry to another.

The industry export and import data _were obtained

from available O.E.C.0. statistics [19].
Market Power
While no unique measure of market power exists, it is generally agreed
'

among students cif industrial organization
that the existence of market power
.
'

.

.

.

.

.

rests crucially upon the number and size distribution of sellers in an ·industry.
· When the number of s~llers is.small, each seller recognizes his-interdependence
with others and that his actions will have an impact on industry prices and
o~tput~ · In addition, collusion (tacit or covert) to obtain monopoly prices is
easier when .the number ~f se 11 ers is l imi.ted. Market power is, thus, considered
to be closely associated with measures o_f industry conce_ntration.

In this

analysis market power was expressed-alternatively as a weighted concentration

..

.
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ratio (CR) or an employment entropy measure (E}.

I

The weighted crincentration

ratio (weights being industry value of shipments) was calculated from data in
the Census.of Manufactures {22].

Since weighted concentration ratios have been

. criticized as not being accurate measures of actual industry concentration [2]
an ·employment entropy measure which could be constructed more directly from the
data was also utilized. 7 The entropy measure of concentration is defined as
N
.
(E) = :Eqi log 2qi, where qi equals the share of employment of the ; th firm. If
1=1
an industry were monopolized then qi= l and E would have a value of O. The
numerical value of entropy will increase as (a) the number of firms in an
industry increases, or (b} employment shares become more evenly distributed
among firms within an in'dustry.

Entropy is thus, inversely rel.ated to concen-

tration with high levels of entropy indicative of low degrees of concentration·
and vice versa.

This measure was calculated from· Census data [22] along the
lines suggested by Horowitz [l OJ~ 8 .
While the degree of industrial. concentration (however measured) is con-

sidered to be the critical determinant of industrial market power, the conduct
and performance· of an industry is determined by the interaction of concentration with other elements of industrial structure.

If the-effects of market

power, as evidenced by seller concentration, on international trade perform.ance
are to be properly identified, it.is necessary to account for the impact of
other structural characteristics as well.
Economies of Scale
A first industry characteristic which must be considered is the degree to
which economies of scale exist in an industry. The presence of economies of
scale, for instance, may not only result in an industry becoming highly concentrated, but could also increase the international competitivene~s of domestic

.

:
I
I
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firms.

While one might infer that concentration is nothing more than a reflec-

tion of economies of scale, such a conclusion-would be misleading~
.

-

Economies
.

.

of scale certainly do e~plain the degree of concentration in some industries,
'

.

.

.

.

.

but by no means all.•. Concentration is affected by a.variety of-factors such as
merger activity, industry growth, government policies and even stochastic or
random_events. 9 But, since economies of scale may affect international trade
performance by providing domestic producers cost advantages in world markets
and also generate feedback effects upon the level of industry concentration,
they must be accounted for if the effects of market power are to be isolated.
As a proxy for economies of scale (ES) a measure developed by Hufbauer
[12, pp. 178-181] was utilized·. This variable reflects cross industry differ:.
entials in the achievement of increases in value-added p~r worker as the size
.....

of plant increases. • Industries capable of achieving increases inproductivity
as size. of plant increases are considered to possess scale advantages and evidence higher:esti~ated scale coefficients.
Product Differentiation
The behavior of firms wi 11 a1so be influenced by the degree of product
. differentiation within an industry.

When products are differentiated the

market share of individual producers becomes less sensitive to variations in
prfces offered by rivals resulting in a variety of forms of non-price competi. tion.

In addition, differentiation may create barriers not only to potential

domestic entrants; but to foreign produ_c,~rs as well.

However, differentiation,

if created by advertising and marketing methods, cannot be expected to tr~nscend
national boundaries.· What may be of more importance is the ability of the firm
to produce customized orders to the differing specifications demanded by foreign
buyers or produce goods which are specifically designed to meet, the taste of
consumers in the countries to which<they are· sold.

-11The coefficient of variation in unit values of 1~65 United States exp-arts_
destined to different countries as presented by Hufbauer [12, pp. 190-193] was
utilized in the analysis as a proxy for product differentiation (PD).

The

smaller the variation the more standardized ·the product is likely to be,_ whereas
the larger the variation presumably the greater is the degree of differentiation.
Althoug~ this is not the standa~d method of estimating differentiation, no figures for the more typical advertising to sales ratio could be obtained at our
l_evel ·of aggregation.

Nonetheless, variations in unit· values may more accurately

capture the type of differentiation in international markets described above.
Care should be exercised in interpreting this variable sin~e differences in unit
values could be attributable to things other than perceived.quality differences·
· such as discriminatory pricing practices.
Research a~d Development Effort ·
Consideration must also be given to the impact of differing research a11d
deveropment efforts across industries.

Technological leadership which mani-

fe~ts itself in new or impr~v-ed products enables firms to maintain or increase
.

.

.

.

their _market shares. · In addition, the infernat_ional ·trade theory of the ·11 pro.

.

duct cycle [23]
suggests that research and -development acti,vity, which leads
.
11

~

.

-

.

.

.

to successful
-innovations, is an "important advantage for firms 'in international
.
.

markets.

In effect, the successful innovators find themselves with temporary

monopoly positions in world markets as well as ·the domestic market •
.A proxy for research and deyelopment effort (R & D) was constructed with
data provided by Keesing [15] and was calculated as the percentage of scientists
and engineers in an industry I s labor force.

While quanti.fi ca ti on of the R &, D

effort has been directed toward analyzing either the output side of the process

-12-

(patent production) or the input side (R &O expenditures or employment pf
R & D personnel), the input measure was relied upon since this was the only
cine available for the industry sample.
Mean Distanc~ Shipped
Finally, stnc~ goods are not equally transportable, the impact of cross
industry differentials in transportation cost must be taken into account. A
meausre developed by Weiss [24] was utilized as a proxy to account for transportation cost differentials.

The variable is calculated as the mean distance

(in miles) the products of an industry were shipped in U.S. markets (MOS). ·
The implicit assumption
in the use of this proxy is that the further a produ~t
.

,

.

'

.

can be profitably shipped (i.e., the greater the mean distance shipped) the
less important are transpo_rtation costs relative to other costs •.

IV.

The Empirical Results
The multiple regression equations relating exports and imports to market

power and other industry characteristics are presented. in Table 1.

Results

are provided for the total industry sample and sub-samples consistfog of exporting industries and import-competing industries. The coefficient of deter~
.mi nation (R 2) and F value are given_ for each estimated equation and "t" values
for the estimated coefficients are provided in the parentheses below them.
Given that these are cross-section estimates and that the model does not represent a complete explanation of U.S. international trade performance, the R2
values seem quite satisfactory.

In addition, an examination of the correlation

· matrix of independent variables failed to provide evidence th~t multicollinearity
was.a problem.
\

-13With regard to the export equations (X/VS ~ presented in Table l , the signs
of the coefficients for th~weighted concentration ratio and entropy variables
support the hypothesis that market power, as measured by fewness of sellers,
. exerts a posi_tive influence upon industry exports.

This positive relation is

observed not only for the total industry sample, but for the sub-sample of
exporting industries as well.

Only the entropy coeffictents, however, are·

si gni fi cant at a 5% level or better.

Other industry characteristics such as

product differentiation, economies of scale and distance shipped, were also
,

important in explaining industry exports.

Each of the coefficients for these

variables display the expected positive sign and all are significant at a 10%
level or better.·
The results obtained for researcti and development effort, however, were not
impressive.

The coefficients for the R & D variable are not significant in .any

of the export equations and in one case display an- unexpected negative sign.
This result is perplexing since R

&D has

been strongly supported in the liter-

ature [14, 15] as a source of·U.S. comparative advantage.

This finding could

be explained perhaps by aggregation problems in_ the data, or the inability of
:the proxy to properly capture the dynamics of the R &o·.

In addition, evidence

exists [ll] which suggests that direct fqreign inv~stment by U.S. companies·
(especially in d~veloped countries) is concentrated primarily in research intensive. industries.

Thus, in these industries fo_reign sales by subsidiaries may
have been substftuted for what otherwise would have been export !iales. 10 Finally,

the trade indicator used (exports as a percentage of value of shipments) does
not necessarily measure comparative advantage for an industry, nor is it the
measure most commonly used in studies of the i"mpact of R & D on international
trade.

Rather, comparative advantage has ··been _couched in terms of the relative

Table 1:

Dependent
Variable

Regression Equations Relating Selected Domestic Market Characteristics to~~/· Exports (X/VS).
· and Imports (M/VS) as a Percent of Domestic Value of Shipments, 196~
·.
·
(t-values in parentheses)
·
·

Market Power
Intercept . Concentration
. Employment
Ratio (CR)
Entropy (E)

Other Industry Cha racteri s ti cs·
Product Differ- .· R & D EfMean Distance- · R2
entiation {PD)
fort (R&D)
Shipped (MOS)

Scale Economies ( ES)

F

All Industries (88)
X/VS

-6.09
(l. 34 )*

X/VS

8.86.
( 1. 69 )**

M/VS

-3.54
( .648)

M/VS

23.00
(3.82)***

.071

(1.15)
'-l.92 ·
(3.38)***
.161
(2. 18)**

-3. 20 ·
( 4.89 )***

. 022
(l.85)**

.041
( 1. 38)*

0.40
(. 099)

.012
(2 .03)**

. 14

2.67

~021
. (1. 86)**

. 041
( 1.49 )*

- .149
( .400)

.010
(1. 83 )**

.23

4.98

-.030
(2. l O)**

.008
(. 222)

-1.2]
(2.48)***

.017
(2.39)***

.17

3.37

-.032
(2.45)***

.004 ·
(.134)

;:;J, 43
(3.31}***

.32

7.74

.014
. (2.,22)**

Exporting Industries (50)b/
X/VS
X/VS

, -~:545
(.080)

.021
(. 250)

14.50
(l.78)**

-2 .12
(2.37}**

.053
(2.59)***

·-.004
(. 094)

;092
(.155)

.012
(1.12)

· .20

2.20

.045
(2.29)**

.014
(; 324)

- • 1·42
(.253)

.007
( ~668)

. 29

3. 58

.021
(1. 64)*

.33

3.18

.022
(1. 93)**

.45

.5.21

Import-Competing Industries (38)c/
M/VS

-17.89
(1.72)**

M/VS

32.67
(2.50)***

.448
(2.69)***
-'-5.30
(3:95)***

- . 05.0
(1.89)**

.095
(1.36)*·

- .051
(2.14)**

.026
(.414)

Yrhe significance of the coefficients was tested by a one,-tail t test.
.

·

.

·

'

•

•

'

•

'

-2.45
(2.03)**

* Significant at the .. 90 level.
** Significant at the .95 level.
*** ~Significant at the .99 level.

!VExporting industries were defined .as those with a positive net export bal.ance.
Yimport-compej:ing •industries were those with a negative net export balance. ·
w

· -2.13'
(1.56)*

I
__,.
~

. I

-15competitiveness of industries across countries in measures such as net industry
exports or industry exports as a percentage of world exports.

Si nee the results ·

obtained did differ from those obtained in the literature [8, 12, 14, 15], the
·following regression was estimated in which U.S. industry exports as a percentage
of O.E.C.D. export~.was introduced as the dependent variable.

i
i
..
X /X
d = - .843 + .080 CR+ .027 ES
+ .091 PD + .939 R&D. + :005 MOS
us oec
· (.197) (L38)*
(2.43)***. (3:22)***
(2.45)***
(.885)
2
R = .32

F

= 7. 54

As may be observed, the coefficient of R&D was positive and significant at the.
1%, level, which confirms the importance of R&D effort as a determinant of U.S.

comparative advantage.

Moreover, the coefficient of the concentration ratio· .

was positive·and significant at the 10% level, which corroborates the findings
of' this study •
.· Analysis of the import ~quations (M/VS) in Table 1 provides conside~able
support for the hypothesis that in import-competing situ.at ions the existence
of market power is likely to result in industries allowing higher levels of
imports.

In bpth the total industry sample and the import-competing industry

sub-sample the coefficients for the weighted concen~ration ratio and entropy

a positive

variables display signs which indicate
power and import levels.

relationship between market

Furthermore, in all cases these coefficients are

significant -at a 5% level or better.

Additionally, these equati_ons emphasize

the importance of economies of scale and research and development effort -in
improving import-competing performance.

The coefficients for each of these.

variables show the expected negative sign and are significant at a 5% level or
better.

Finally, as expected~ a positive and significant coefficient was

obtained for the mean distance shipped variab]e.

-16Taken as a Whale, the above results suggest that the existence of market·
power effects an industry's export or import-competing perfonnance in the
ways suggested earlier.

It should be· remembered, however, that a theoretical

~rere~uisite for this conclusi6n is that some impediment tri trade exists which
isolates domestic industries from foreign competi.tion .. Indeed, in· the absence
of some -impediment to trade, market power should ·have no or little effect upon
an industry's intern_ational trade performance.

Therefore, the effects of

market power on international trade should be most pronounced in indust~ies
which are afforded some form of protection. · In order to test this hypothesh,
· one final set of relationships was. investigated.

The original sample of

industries was brok.en into two sub-samples based upon the .degree .of nominal
tariff protection provided an industry.

The first sample contained industries

considered to have high tariff protection, while the .second contained industries
11
wi~h low tariff protection.
The regression results for these two sub-samples
are presented: in Table 2 which fa 11 ows the format of Table l.
Inspection of Table 2 confirms, the expected relationship ·between market
power, protection and export and .import-colllpeting perfonnanCe•.

In the low

tariff industry sample no rel ati onshi p between market power and either exports
or imports can be oqserved.
•,

The coefficients
for the weighted concentration
.
,

'

'

ratio and entropy are not significant in any of the .estimated equations.

Within

the high tariff ·industry sample, however, these C()efficients are significant
in both the export and import equations !;ind their signs parallel those presented
in Tablel. Thus, as expected, domestic market power is observed to be a more
important factor in influencing exports or imports in industries which enjoy
tariffs or other barriers .to trade.

.

.

'

'

:

.. Table 2: Regression Results .. of U.S. Exports and Imports as a Petcent of Domestic V&lue
... of Shipments on Domestic Market Characteristics: High and Low-Tariff IndustriesY
. (t-values in parentheses)
·
D~pendent
Vari ab le

Intercept

Market Power
Concentration
Er'npJoy(l1ent
Ratio ( CR)
. Entropy (E)

Scale Economies (ES)

Other Indus trt Characteristics
Product DifferR & D EfMean Di stance'."
fort ( R&D} , Shipped (MOS)
· entiation (PD)

High-Tariff Indost~ies (41
X/VS

-11. 56
(2. 67)*** , .

X/VS

l. 23 .
.( .239)

M/VS

-12.51
(l.41}*

M/VS

19.93
( 1.91}**

.. 001

. 093·
(1. 66 ).*
-1.31
(2.66)***.
.255
(2.23)**
-3.22
(3.23)***

R2

F

iW

(.075)

. l 11
·. (3. 54)***

-.263
(. 719)

-.005
(.299)

.104
(3.48)***

· -.271
(. 801)

.OTO

. 37 ,·· 4.17

. 009
(l.6l)*

.44 · 5.44

, (1. 75)**

.011
( .308)

-.091
(1.41 )*

-2 .09.
(2.79)***

. 0·14
(1.19)

.25

2.31

-.004
(.119)

.073
(1.21)

-2.06
(3.01)***.

.011.
(. 969)

.34

3.59

-.013
(. 87£)

-.006
(. l 84)

.236
(. 438)

.014
(2.01)**

. 21

1.49

-.012
(.700)

-.006

. 014
(2.03)**

.21

l. 51

C.J97}

.226
(. 433)

- .100
(5.69)***

•;037
(1.06)

· -.584
(. 939)

. 013
(1.65)*

.63

9.47

. -.099
(5.] 7}***

:.. .032.
(.984)

-.670
(1.11)

. 013
(l.65)*

.63

. 9.48

Low-Tariff Industries (34)c/
X/VS .

-1.38
(. 257)

X/VS

.455
(.073)

'.

M/VS

7.67
( l. 24)

Vi/VS

8. 24
(1.14)

~

.012
{. 156)
-.258
( .290)
-. 018 ·
· (.199)
-.259·
(. 251)

* Significani at the .90 level.
** Significant at the . 95 1eve 1.
*** Significant at the . 99 level.

)j "High-Tariff Industries" are defined as .those industries protected by at least a 13.54% nominal import tariff.
, tariff rate for this g·roup is 20.82% ..

J

Defined as industries protected by at.most a 10.00% nominal import tariff.

The meari

Th~ mean import tariff within this, g·roup is 5.56%.
I
__,

......,

,·.
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Conclusions.
The purpose of this paper has been to explore the role of domestic market·

power in international trade.

The results of our statistical analysis on

United States manufacturing industries provide considerable support for the
hypothesis that domestic market structure is an important factor in i nfl uenci ng
an industry's export and fmport competing perfo.rmance, particularly in industri-es

•

I

I
I

I
I

afforded protection from foreign competition.

Both exports and imports were

found positive}y related to domestic market power (as measured by seller
concentration.or entropy) and the relationship was statistically significant.
From a policy point of view, these results suggest that changes in antitrust laws and enforcement aim.ed at improving the balance of trade may well
be counterproductive.

While greater industry concentration does appear to

improve the performance of industries in exporting situations, it impairs
industry performance in import competing situations.-

Thus, even disregarding.

the domestic allocative effects of greater monopoly power, serious doubts
should be cast upon the desirability of such policies.

. -19Footnotes
*We are indebted to Elizabeth Clayton, ·Ira Horowitz, Gary Hufbauer, William
Merri 11, Hugh Nourse and an anonymou_s referee for helpful comments and
suggestions an~ Mike Mergler for computational assista.nce.
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the Center for International Studies and the Office of

Research Administration (Summer Research Fellowship) at the University of
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sible for·any remaining errors.

1.

As genera 1ly defined, market power refers to the abi 1_i ty of a firm to
control the price, quantity or characteristics of the product it sells.
Market power usually exists when:

(1) a few large sellers dominate the

· market, (2) there are few substitutes :for the firm's product and (3) entry·
bynew producers is difficult.
2.

For example, see U.S. Department of State, News Release, Bureau of Public
Affairs, Office of. Media Services, April 11, 1973.

See also the New York

Times, January 9, 1972, Section XII, ·p. 31; the New York Times, November 12,

1972, Section III; p. 7; and the Washington Post, April 14, 1973, p. ES.
3 •. While a number of definitions of the concept of dumping have appeared in
the literature, in this article dumping is defined as selling a product
abroad at a lower price than at home after allowance is made for differentials in transportation costs, packaging costs, and quantity discounts.
4.

This point has been argued by L. Esposito and F. F. Esposito [8].

5.

We are grateful· to ,Gary Hufbauer for providing-us a corrected version of
his concordance ori gi na lly presented fn [12].
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6.

Exporting industries were defined as industries with a positive net export
balance, while import-competing industries were those with a negative net
export balance.

7. While the entropy measure is preferred because it avoids the aggregration
problems associated with the weighted concentration ratio, the data indicate that the two measures are highly correlated.

For our sample of indus- ·

tries the simple correlation between the two is -.63.
8.

The entropy measure of concentration was originally proposed by Theil [21].
For a more complete discussion of the merits of entropy vs. other measures
of concentration see:

9.

[9].

For a more complete analysis of the determinants of concentration see
[20, pp. 72-130] and [25].

10.

Horst [11] found evidence of this substitution in u.s.~canadian trade.

11.

High-tariff industries were defined as those protected by at least a 13.54%
import tariff.

Lqw-tariff industries were those protected by at most a 10%

import tariff.

Industries falling between these two limits were dropped

from the equations in order to more clearly distinguish between the two
groups.

'.
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